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Abstract
An abstract architecture for idealized multi-agent systems whose be-
haviour is regulated by normative systems is developed and discussed.
Agent choices are determined partially by the preference ordering of pos-
sible states and partially by normative considerations: The agent chooses
that act which leads to the best outcome of all permissible actions. If an
action is non-permissible depends on if the result of performing that ac-
tion leads to a state satisfying a condition which is forbidden, according to
the norms regulating the multi-agent system. This idea is formalized by
defining set-theoretic predicates characterizing multi-agent systems. The
definition of the predicate uses decision theory, the Kanger-Lindahl the-
ory of normative positions, and an algebraic representation of normative
systems.
Keywords: Norm, Multi-agent system, Norm-regulated system, Agent
architecture, Boolean algebra, Normative position
1 Introduction
Within economic theory the consumer’s behaviour has traditionally been
described as determined by a utility function. During the latest two
decades there has been a growing interest among researchers in how norms
(for example rules of law) give restrictions on the behaviour induced by
the utility function. The behaviour of the consumers or other economic
agents, according to this model, is the result of an interplay between op-
timization of the utility function and restrictions due to norms. We will
here show how this model can be used for regulating the behaviour of
artificial agents.
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An important problem in the behavioral sciences is how the auton-
omy of the individual can be reconciled with collective rationality, i.e. the
rationality of the group?1 If the individual is a human agent and the
collective in question is the state, we are approaching a profound problem
for politics and social science. However, here we limit ourselves to some
aspects of a more modest question: What is an appropriate formal frame-
work for the unification of individual autonomy with collective rationality
for artificial agent systems? To our technical problem, the solution could
be an agent architecture with a large range of applications. But this tech-
nical problem also has some bearing on the more general one mentioned
above, as it may make it possible to construct and test model systems
which resemble human social systems in some basic sense.
The approach to unification of individual autonomy and collective ra-
tionality chosen here is, as has already been emphasized, to focus on
norms. There are mainly two aspects of norms in relation to multi-agent
systems that will be dealt with, viz.
(1) the formal representation of norms regulating multi-agent systems
and
(2) the role of norms in architectures for multi-agent systems.
These two aspects of multi-agent systems (Mas) are not independent,
on the contrary: they presuppose each other. The aim of the essay as far
as norm representation is concerned is to test an algebraic representation
of normative systems [19] [20] [21] [24] [25] utilizing the Kanger-Lindahl
theory of normative positions [14] [17] [18], and its later developments.
In this essay we will discuss some characteristic features of this kind of
norm representation and investigate the possibility of using it in Mas ar-
chitectures. We have strived for imposing no particular choice of Mas
architecture; a related study for a Belief-Desire-Intention agent architec-
ture, for instance, is [9].
Next a few words about (2). The role that norms will have in Mas
architectures is to delimit the autonomy of the agents. Metaphorically one
can say that the norms define the scope (Spielraum) for an agent. The
‘wish’ or ‘desire’ of an agent is represented as a preference structure over
possible states or situations.2 From the norms of the system will follow
a deontic structure of the states (consisting for example of normative
positions) implying that some states are permissible while the rest are non-
permissible. The agent chooses an act which leads to the permissible state
it prefers the most. In section 3, we will transform this idea to a theory or
model of how norms can be used to regulate the behaviour of multi-agent
systems. The model will use the kind of norm representation mentioned
above and it will be expressed in terms of set-theoretical predicates. Since
this is the first attempt to test the above described approach we will use
a rather idealized kind of Mas. The extent and goal of the idealization
will be discussed at the beginning of section 3.
The study of how the behaviour of agents can be regulated by norms
1Related to this problem is the question whether the autonomy of one individual restricts
the autonomy of other individuals.
2A preference structure consists of a preference relation and perhaps one or several other
relations, for example a difference relation.
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has been pursued within many fields, including biology, computer science,
economics, law, sociology and philosophy. Formalisms have often been
employed in cross-disciplinary fashion, as in the combination of mathe-
matics and logic [24], speech act theory and computational linguistics [8],
and computer science and anticipatory systems [4]. What constitutes a
norm naturally differs between such approaches. In this essay, a norm is
represented as an implicative sentence where the antecedent is a descrip-
tive condition stating the circumstances of an agent, and the consequent is
a condition expressing the normative position that the agent has with re-
spect to a state of affairs. A normative system is a joining of two Boolean
algebra based on such implications. Our approach to norms is within the
tradition of algebraic logic.
It is possible to regard the expression ‘norms for artificial agents’ as
metaphorical, but we do not. From a formal point of view, multi-agent
systems are sufficiently similar independently of whether the agents are
human or not. In this essay, we adopt a fairly formal notion of a norm:
a norm is characterized by its form or structure and not, for example, by
its function.
In section 2, norms and normative systems are examined from differ-
ent perspectives. The Kanger-Lindahl theory of normative positions is
presented, and the representation problem of normative systems is intro-
duced and an algebraic approach to its solution is outlined. In section 3,
an abstract architecture for Mas based on deontic-action-logic is intro-
duced. The formal structure of norms regulating the behaviour of such
systems is presented in section 4. In sections 2-4, some of the ideas are
elucidated using the waste collectors example. In section 5, an important
step in the theory construction is presented, namely a scheme for how
normative positions will restrict the set of acts that the agents are per-
mitted to choose from. Section 6 contains conclusions and a discussion of
possible extensions of the study.
2 Representations of Norms
2.1 The Waste Collectors Example
We illustrate some of the ideas in this essay using an example, introduced
in [3], of a team of robots collecting nuclear waste. Each robot is here
represented as one agent, and is placed on a spatial grid. It is important
to realize that this example is here exploited for elucidating the role of
norms in regulating the behavior of an agent system. It is not what the
norms say, the material content of the norms, that is of interest here but
their logical form and their formal connection to other parts of the agent
architecture. Thus it is not the reasonableness of the normative systems
which interest us but the reasonableness of the form of their representation
and their role in the architecture.
Think of a spatial grid of squares in rows and columns. Each square is
assigned a coordinate consisting of an ordered pair of integers, where the
first number in the pair represents the column and the second the row.
On some squares there is a number representing an amount of waste. A
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group of agents, in the sequel called collectors, tries to collect as much
waste as possible. Each collector has a utility function, such that the
utility depends on the amount of waste per unit time (or unit distance).
The agents can move one square at a time in four directions, up
(north), down (south), left (west) and right (east); these are the possible
actions of the agents. But there are restrictions on how they may move.
It is especially important how an agent may move in the neighbourhood of
another. The protected sphere around the agent ω consists of nine squares
forming a large square with ω in the middle, i.e. the protected sphere is
the von Neumann neighbourhood of ω. The protected spheres of ω1 and
ω2 can overlap with 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 or 9 squares.
We will now present a set of norms which regulates how the agents
may move. Suppose ω1 is about to move.
(n1) If the protected spheres of ω1 and ω2 do not overlap then ω1 may
not move so that ω1 and ω2 overlap with two or three squares.
(n2) If the protected spheres of ω1 and ω2 do not overlap then ω1 may
move so that ω1 and ω2 overlap with zero or one square.
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(n3) If the protected spheres of ω1 and ω2 overlap with one or two
squares, then ω1 may move so that the protected spheres of ω1 and ω2
overlap with any number of squares (even zero).
(n4) ω1 may move so that the protected spheres of ω1 and ω2 overlap
with six squares only if the protected spheres of ω1 and ω2 overlap with
at least four squares.
(n5) If the protected spheres of ω1 and ω2 overlap with four squares
then ω1 shall move so that the protected spheres of ω1 and ω2 do not
overlap with three squares.
(n6) If the protected spheres of ω1 and ω2 overlap with six squares,
then ω1 must move so that the protected spheres of ω1 and ω2 overlap
with at least four squares.
(n7) ω1 may never move so that the protected spheres of ω1 and ω2
overlap with nine squares.
(n8) ω1 may always move so that the protected spheres of ω1 and ω2
overlap with zero squares.
This is a very primitive normative system, but it is not so easy to see
what it says. To grasp the content of the normative system a transparent
way of structuring and representing the norms is necessary. It is easy
to see that most of the norms, but not all of them, are implications, i.e.
of the form p implies q. However, as we will see in a later section, all
of them can easily be transformed to implications. Note also that the
norms contain expressions like may, may not and shall. To simplify, let
us introduce some predicates. The protected sphere around ω is denoted
Protec(ω). Lapi(ω1, ω2) means that the protected spheres around ω1 and
ω2 overlap with i squares. As a first step in the formalization of norms
(n1) and (n2) we can write them as follows:
(n1) If Lap0(ω1, ω2) then it may not be the case that ω1 sees to it that
Lap2(ω1, ω2) or Lap3(ω1, ω2).
3Note that if the protected spheres of ω1 and ω2 do not overlap then ω1 cannot move so
that the spheres of ω1 and ω2 overlap with more than three squares.
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(n2) If Lap0(ω1, ω2) then it may be the case that ω1 sees to it that
Lap0(ω1, ω2) and Lap1(ω1, ω2).
The expression ‘ω1 sees to it that’ states the fact that ω1 is active and
moves and thereby sees to it that the overlap in question is realized. Let us
use Do(ω1, F ) as an abbreviation for ‘ω1 sees to it that F ’. Furthermore,
let us use ‘May’ as an abbreviation for ‘it may be the case that’ and ‘Shall’
for ‘it shall be the case that. We can then represent norms (n1) and (n2)
as follows.
(n1) Lap0(ω1, ω2) −→ ¬May Do(ω1, Lap2(ω1, ω2) ∨ Lap3(ω1, ω2))
(n2) Lap0(ω1, ω2)−→May Do(ω1, Lap0(ω1, ω2))∧May Do(ω1, Lap1(ω1, ω2))
The other norms can be represented in a similar way.
(n3) For all i, 0 ≤ i ≤ 9, Lap1(ω1, ω2)∨Lap2(ω1, ω2) −→May Do(ω1, Lapi(ω1, ω2))
(n4) ¬Lap4(ω1, ω2)∧¬Lap6(ω1, ω2)∧¬Lap9(ω1, ω2)−→¬May Do(ω1, Lap6(ω1, ω2))
(n5) Lap4(ω1, ω2) −→ Shall Do(ω1,¬ Lap3(ω1, ω2))
(n6) Lap6(ω1, ω2)−→ Shall Do(ω1, Lap4(ω1, ω2)∨Lap6(ω1, ω2)∨Lap9(ω1, ω2))
(n7) ω1 6= ω2 −→ ¬May Do(ω1, Lap9(ω1, ω2))
(n8) May Do(ω1, Lap0(ω1, ω2))
In the formulations of (n1)− (n8) we have as a simplification omitted
the universal quantifiers. For example (n1) ought to be written more
completely as
(n′1) ∀ω2 : [Lap0(ω1, ω2) −→ ¬May Do(ω1, Lap2(ω1, ω2) ∨ Lap3(ω1, ω2))]
This is just the first step in the representation of norms using de-
ontic and action logic. In the next section we will discuss this kind of
representation in some detail and show how we can get a more effective
representation. We will return to the waste collectors in sections 3 and 4.
Note that a typical norm asserts that if a condition on the position of
ω1 is fulfilled, then ω1 may or may not see to it that another condition will
or will not be the case. An idea elaborated on in section 5 is that it is not
permissible for ω1 to perform an act which leads to a situation such that
a condition c will be fulfilled, if c is such that ω1 may not see to it that c
is fulfilled. In this way the norms formulated in terms of requirements on
positions determine what is permissible or obligatory for the agent to do
in a given situation.
2.2 Norms as Ordered Pairs
A typical norm is a universal implication and in predicate logic it can
often be represented as a universal sentence of the following form:
(n9) : ∀x1, ..., xν : p(x1, ..., xν) −→ q(x1, ..., xν).
Syntactically it consists of three parts: the sequence of universal quan-
tifiers, the antecedent formula and the consequent formula. Note that
norm (n9) correlates open sentences: p(x1, ..., xν) is correlated to q(x1, ..., xν).
An alternative point of view is to regard p and q as conditions and a norm
as a relational statement correlating them:
(n10) : pRq
It is important here that the free variables in p(x1, ..., xν) are the same
and in the same order as the free variables in q(x1, ..., xν). (It is, however,
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not necessary that p and q have the same arity, for details see [20].) R is a
binary relation, and pRq is a relational statement equivalent to 〈p, q〉 ∈ R.
Thus, we can represent a norm as pRq or 〈p, q〉 ∈ R, and from the latter
relational statement it is just a small step to the representation of (n10) as
the ordered pair 〈p, q〉 where p is called the ground and q the consequence
of the norm. A ground is a descriptive and a consequence is a normative
condition.
As is easy to see, we can form conjunctions, disjunctions and negations
of conditions in the following way.
(p ∧ q)(ω1, ..., ων) if and only if p(ω1, ..., ων) and q(ω1, ..., ων).
(p ∨ q)(ω1, ..., ων) if and only if p(ω1, ..., ων) or q(ω1, ..., ων).
(p′)(ω1, ..., ων) if and only if ¬p(ω1, ..., ων).
It is therefore possible to construct Boolean algebras of conditions and
we will return to this in subsection 2.4.
If p is a ν-ary condition and i1,...,iν are individuals, then p(i1, ..., iν) is
a sentence. A norm 〈p, q〉 can be regarded as a mechanism of inference. We
can distinguish two cases. Suppose that p and s are descriptive conditions
and q and t are normative.
1. From p(i1, ..., iν) together with 〈p, q〉 follows q(i1, ..., iν).
2. From sRp together with 〈p, q〉 and qRt follows sRt.4
In 1, 〈p, q〉 functions as a deductive mechanism correlating sentences
by means of instantiation, while in 2, 〈p, q〉 correlates one condition to an-
other condition. Therefore, in the terminology of [1], 1 corresponds to the
correlation of individual cases to individual solutions, and 2 corresponds
to the correlation of generic cases to generic solutions.
Let us return to the suggested norm (n1) in the waste collector example
above. The ground of the norm is the binary condition Lap0 and the
consequence is the condition Λ defined in the following way:
Λ(ω1, ω2) iff ¬May Do(ω1, Lap2(ω1, ω2) ∨ Lap3(ω1, ω2)).
Λ is a normative condition obtained by applying the operators May
and Do to the disjunction of the descriptive conditions Lap2 and Lap3.
2.3 Normative Positions
An important contribution to deontic logic was made by Stig Kanger,
who combined the deontic operator Shall with the binary action operator
Do [13]. To be specific, Shall Do(x, q) means that it shall be that x sees to
it that q, while ¬Shall Do(y,¬q) means that it is not the case that it shall
be that y sees to it that not q. The combination of the deontic operator
Shall with the action operator Do and the negation operation ¬ gives us
a powerful language for expressing purely normative sentences. Kanger
emphasized the possibilities of external and internal negation of sentences
where these operators are combined. Using combinations of deontic and
4Note that sRp is relating two sentences of the same kind and the same holds for qRt;
s and p are descriptive but q and t are normative. A norm consists of sentences of different
kinds.
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action operators, we can formulate norms in a concise way. A conditional
norm may for example have the form:
p(x, y)→ Shall Do(x,¬q(y)).
Note that the sentence May Do(x, q) can be defined in terms of the
operators Shall and Do in the following way:
May Do(x, q) if and only if ¬Shall ¬Do(x, q).
The logical postulates for Shall and Do assumed by Kanger are (where
=⇒ is the relation of logical consequence and ⇐⇒ of logical equivalence):
1. If p =⇒ q, then Shall p =⇒ Shall q.
2. (Shall p & Shall q) =⇒ Shall(p & q).
3. Shall p =⇒ ¬Shall ¬ p.
4. If p ⇐⇒ q, then Do(x, p)⇐⇒ Do(x, q).
5. Do(x, p) =⇒ p.
The five conditions are, according to Kanger, acceptable in most con-
texts.
Kanger used the deontic-action-language as a basis for a theory of
normative positions and his theory, expressed as a theory of types of
rights, was further developed by Lars Lindahl in his three systems of
types of normative positions [17]. The simplest one is the system of one-
agent types of normative position, and we will restrict ourselves to the
utilization of this system here.
Let ±α stand for either of α or ¬α. Starting from the scheme±May±Do(x,±q),
where ± stands for the two alternatives of affirmation or negation, a list is
made of all maximal and consistent conjunctions—maxiconjunctions (see
[22] p.405f.)— such that each conjunct satisfies the scheme. Note that the
expression ¬Do(x,q)& ¬Do(x,¬q) expresses x ’s passivity with regard to q.
Here this expression is abbreviated as Pass(x, q). By this procedure the
following list of seven maxiconjunctions is obtained, which are denoted
T1(x, q),. . . ,T7(x, q) (see [17], p.92).
• T1(x, q) : MayDo(x, q) & MayPass(x, q) & MayDo(x,¬q).
• T2(x, q) : MayDo(x, q) & MayPass(x, q) & ¬MayDo(x,¬q).
• T3(x, q) : MayDo(x, q) & ¬MayPass(x, q) & MayDo(x,¬q).
• T4(x, q) : ¬MayDo(x, q) & MayPass(x, q) & MayDo(x,¬q).
• T5(x, q) : MayDo(x, q) & ¬MayPass(x, q) & ¬MayDo(x,¬q).
• T6(x, q) : ¬MayDo(x, q) & MayPass(x, q) & ¬MayDo(x,¬q).
• T7(x, q) : ¬MayDo(x, q) & ¬MayPass(x, q) & MayDo(x,¬q).
T1,. . . ,T7 are called the types of one-agent positions. Note that
¬MayDo (x, q) & ¬ MayPass (x, q) & ¬MayDo(x,¬q) is logically false,
according to the logic of Shall and May. It is easy to see that the last
three types can more concisely be described as follows:
• T5(x, q) : Shall Do(x, q).
• T6(x, q) : Shall Pass(x, q).
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• T7(x, q) : Shall Do(x,¬q).
Note that the following symmetry principles hold:
• T1(x, q) if and only if T1(x,¬q)
• T2(x, q) if and only if T4(x,¬q)
• T3(x, q) if and only if T3(x,¬q)
• T5(x, q) if and only if T7(x,¬q)
• T6(x, q) if and only if T6(x,¬q)
The systems of normative positions can serve as a tool for describing
the normative positions of different agents x, y, z... with regard to states
of affairs p, q, r, .... A set of such descriptions, however, is not a represen-
tation of a normative system. This is due to the fact that a normative
system is not a description of the actual normative positions of individuals.
Rather, the essential feature of a normative system consists in so-called
normative correlations, i.e., as jurists might say, in correlating norma-
tive consequences to operative facts. The formal system of normative
positions increases the expressive power of norm formulation as regards
consequences.
The one-agent types in the Kanger-Lindahl theory of normative po-
sitions can be used as operators on descriptive conditions to get deontic
conditions [21]. As a simple example, suppose that r is a unary con-
dition. Then Tir (with 1 ≤ i ≤ 7) is the binary condition such that
Tir(y, x) iff Ti(x, r(y)), where Ti(x, r(y)) is the ith formula of one-agent
normative positions. Note that for example T3(x, r(y)) means
MayDo(x, r(y)) & ¬MayPass(x, r(y)) & MayDo(x,¬r(y)).
If 〈p, Tir〉 is a norm, then from p(x1, x2) we can, by using the norm, in-
fer Tir(x1, x2) and thus also Ti(x2, r(x1)), which means that, with regard
to the state of affairs r(x1), x2 has a normative position of type Ti.
The theory of normative positions was developed during the 60s and
70s, primarily as an analytical tool to be used in jurisprudence and politi-
cal science; Kanger’s theory was originally expressed as a theory of types of
rights. Some further refinement of the systems have more recently been
made by Andrew J.I. Jones and Marek Sergot (see [11] [12] [27] [28]).
A special feature of the work of Jones and Sergot, as of Herrestad and
Krogh [15] [16], is that applications in computer science are in view. Even
though Sergot has constructed a computer program, Norman-G, based on
the theory of normative positions, we have chosen to base our exposition
on Kanger/Lindahl in order to not complicate the model further.
2.4 Representations of Norms: The Algebraic Ap-
proach
An adequate representation of norms is important for the construction of
norm-based architectures and we will here use an algebraic approach to
the representation problem.5 One of the main tools in this endeavour is
5This subsection is based on earlier work by Lindahl and Odelstad, see [21] [24] [25].
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the theory of a Boolean quasi-ordering, which is an extension of the theory
of Boolean algebras. A norm is regarded as consisting of two objects, a
ground and a consequence standing in a relation to each other. The ground
belongs to one Boolean quasi-ordering and the consequence to another.
Therefore, we can view a normative system as a joining of a Boolean
quasi-ordering of grounds to a Boolean quasi-ordering of consequences.
Definition. The relational structure 〈B,∧,′ , R〉 is a Boolean quasi-ordering
(Bqo) if 〈B,∧,′ 〉 is Boolean algebra and R is a binary, reflexive and tran-
sitive relation on B (i.e. R is a quasi-ordering) such that R satisfies the
following conditions for all a, b and c in B:
(1) aRb and aRc implies aR(b ∧ c).
(2) aRb implies b′Ra′.
(3) (a ∧ b)Ra.
(4) not ⊤R⊥.
Before we describe the use of Boolean quasi-orderings for representing
norms, let us say a few words on some formal aspects of such structures.
The indifference part of R is denoted Q and is defined by: aQb if and only
if aRb and bRa. Similarly, the strict part of R is denoted S and is defined
by: aSb if and only if aRb and not bRa.
Let ≤ be the partial ordering determined by the Boolean algebra
〈B,∧,′ 〉.6 From requirement (3) for Boolean quasi-orderings it follows that
a ≤ b implies aRb. If 〈B,∧,′ , R〉 is a Boolean quasi-ordering then we say
that the Boolean algebra 〈B,∧,′ 〉 is the reduct of 〈B,∧,′ , R〉, denoted
Bred.
Suppose that B = 〈B,∧,′ , R〉 is a Boolean quasi-ordering and Q is
the indifference part of R. The quotient algebra of B with respect to
Q is a structure 〈B/Q,∩,−,Q〉 such that 〈B/Q,∩,−〉 is a Boolean al-
gebra and Q is the partial ordering determined by this algebra. The
natural mapping of 〈B,∧,′ 〉 onto 〈B/Q,∩,−〉 is a homomorphism [24],
and 〈B/Q,∩,−〉 is called the quotient reduction of B. Thus there are two
Boolean algebras which should be kept apart, namely Bred, i.e. the reduct
of B, and the quotient reduction of B.
Although, by a transition to equivalence classes, from a Boolean quasi-
ordering we get a new Boolean algebra, there is a point in remaining
within the framework of Boolean quasi-orderings. In the models where
the domain of a Boolean quasi-ordering is a set of conditions, we may
want to distinguish two conditions a and b even though it holds that aQb
(and therefore a and b belong to the same Q-equivalence class), because
they may have different meaning.
An important class of models of the theory of Boolean quasi-orderings
consists of models having a set of conditions as its domain.
Definition. A condition implication structure (cis) is a Boolean quasi-
ordering B = 〈B,∧,′ , R〉 such that B is a domain of conditions, and R is
such that aRb represents that a implies b.
This reading of R is justified since, if a and b are ν−ary conditions,
aRb is the representation of
∀x1, .., xν : a(x1, ..., xν)→ b(x1, ..., xν).
6As per usual, ≤ is defined by a ≤ b if and only if a ∧ b = a.
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The theory of Boolean quasi-orderings is of a very general character,
and condition implication structures are not the only kind of models which
are interesting as representations of normative structures. It is easy to see
that we can construct a model of this theory out of a first order theory
Σ. Consider the structure 〈B,∧,′ , R〉 where 〈B,∧,′ 〉 is the Lindenbaum
algebra of the predicate calculus. Let R be the quasi-ordering on B de-
termined by the Lindenbaum algebra of Σ. Then 〈B,∧,′ , R〉 is a Boolean
quasi-ordering (cf. [2], p.61 and [7], p.73).
From an algebraic point of view a norm is a kind of link or joining of
one Boolean quasi-ordering to another. To make this idea precise we need
some definitions.
Definition. The subinterval relation generated by the quasi-orderings
〈B1, R1〉 and 〈B2, R2〉 is the binary relation E on B1 × B2 such that
〈a1, a2〉 E 〈b1, b2〉 if and only if b1Ra1 and a2Rb2.
Note that E is a quasi-ordering, i.e. transitive and reflexive. Let
≎ denote the equality part of E and ⊳ the strict part of E. Then the
following holds:
〈a1, a2〉 ≎ 〈b1, b2〉 if and only if b1Q1a1 and a2Q2b2
〈a1, a2〉 ⊳ 〈b1, b2〉 if and only if (b1S1a1 and a2R2b2) or (b1R1a1 and
a2S2b2)
where Qi is the equality-part of Ri and Si is the strict part of Ri. 〈a1, a2〉
is aminimal element inX ⊆ B1×B2 with respect to 〈B1, R1〉 and 〈B2, R2〉
if and only if there is no 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ X such that 〈x1, x2〉 ⊳ 〈a1, a2〉.
A quasi-ordering is closely related to a partial ordering. If 〈B,R〉 is
a quasi-ordering and Q is the equivalence part of R, then R generates
a partial ordering on the set of Q-equivalence classes generated from B.
The definitions of least upper bound (lub) and greatest lower bound (glb)
for partial orderings are easily extended to quasi-orderings, but the lub
or glb of a subset of a quasi-ordering is not necessarily unique but can
consist of a set of elements.
Definition. A joining-system is an ordered triple 〈B1,B2,J 〉 such that
B1 = 〈B1, R1〉 and B2 = 〈B2, R2〉 are quasi-orderings and J ⊆ B1×B2 and
the following conditions are satisfied where E is the subinterval relation
generated by B1 and B2:
(1) for all b1, c1 ∈ B1 and b2, c2 ∈ B2, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ J and 〈b1, b2〉 E 〈c1, c2〉
implies 〈c1, c2〉 ∈ J ,
(2) if for all c1 ∈ C1 ⊆ B1, 〈c1, b2〉 ∈ J and lub C1 6= ∅, then 〈a1, b2〉 ∈ J
for all a1 ∈ lub C1,
(3) if for all c2 ∈ C2 ⊆ B2, 〈b1, c2〉 ∈ J and glb C2 6= ∅, then 〈b1, a2〉 ∈ J
for all a2 ∈ glb C2.
Definition. Suppose that 〈B1,B2,J 〉 is a joining system. A minimal
element in 〈B1,B2,J 〉 is a minimal element 〈a1, a2〉 in J with respect
to B1 and B2. The set of minimal elements in 〈B1,B2,J 〉 is denoted
min 〈B1,B2,J 〉 or just minJ .
Definition. A Boolean joining-system 〈B1,B2,J 〉 is a joining-system
such that B1 and B2 are Boolean quasi-orderings. A ground-consequence
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system (gc-system) is a Boolean joining-system 〈B1,B2,J 〉 such that B1
and B2 are condition implication structures.
Definition. A Boolean joining-system 〈B1,B2,J 〉 satisfies connectivity if
whenever 〈c1, c2〉 ∈ J there is 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ J such that 〈b1, b2〉 is a minimal
element in 〈B1,B2,J 〉 and 〈b1, b2〉 E 〈c1, c2〉 .
It is easy to see that if a Boolean joining-system satisfies connectivity,
then the set of minimal joinings determines the set of joinings. If in a
Boolean joining-system 〈B1,B2,J 〉, B1 and B2 are complete in a sense
which is a straightforward generalization of the notion of completeness
applied to Boolean algebras, then 〈B1,B2,J 〉 satisfies connectivity. For a
proof, see [23].
A normative system N can be represented as a gc-system 〈B1,B2,J 〉 .
The elements in J are then the norms of the system and in a norm
〈a1, a2〉 , a1 is the ground and a2 the consequence. The elements in minJ
constitute the set of minimal norms of N . If N satisfies connectivity,
then it is characterized by its set of minimal norms, a fact which will be
of interest in the sequel.
The set of minimal elements of a joining system exhibits an interesting
structure and it is possible to distinguish between different types of join-
ing systems depending on the properties of the set of minimal elements
(see [24] and [21]). It is therefore also possible to distinguish between dif-
ferent kinds of normative system depending on the structural properties
of the set of minimal norms. Furthermore, applications of the set of min-
imal norms seem to make changes and extensions of normative systems
easy to describe and make it possible to divide the normative system into
different parts which can be changed independently. However, these lines
of thought will not be pursued here.
3 An Architecture for Norm-Regulation
of Multi-Agent Systems
3.1 Deontic-Action-Logic Multi-Agent Systems
In this section we will give a definition of a deontic-action-logic based
multi-agent system, abbreviated Dalmas. Dalmas is an abstract archi-
tecture (cf. [30], p.31.) for idealized multi-agent systems using normative
systems. The idea behind the architecture is roughly the following. When
it is agent ω’s turn to move it chooses an act out of a set of feasible alterna-
tives and the result will be that the system enters a new state; which state
depends on the actual state of the system when the act is performed. The
agent’s choice is determined partially by the preference ordering of the
possible states and partially by the deontic structure: the agent chooses
that act which leads to the best outcome of all permissible actions. If an
action is permissible or not depends on whether the result of performing
the action leads to a state which satisfies a condition which is forbidden
according to the normative system regulating the multi-agent system. In
this section we shall see how this idea can be formalized.
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Dalmas is a global clock (synchronous update), global state, global
dynamics system. It can be viewed as a simplification constructed for
conceptual and computer simulation purposes. In particular, we use the
system as a model system for studying the interplay between preferences
and norms in Mas architectures. We hope that it will be possible to
transform the definition of a Dalmas into a system that allows for study
through microsimulation (cf. [5]).
Definition. A Dalmas is an ordered 7-tuple 〈Ω, S,A,A,∆,Π,Γ〉 con-
taining
• an agent set Ω (ω,κ, ω1, ... elements in Ω),
• a state or phase space S (r, s, s1, ... elements in S),
• an action set A such that for all a ∈ A, a : Ω × S −→ S such that
a(ω, r) = s means that if the agent ω performs the act a in state r,
then the result will be state s (a, b, a1, ... elements in A),
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• a function A : Ω × S −→ ℘(A) where ℘(A) is the power set of A;
A(ω, s) is the set of acts accessible (feasible) for agent ω in state s,
• a deontic structure-operator ∆ : Ω × S −→ D where D is a set of
deontic structures of the same type with subsets of A as domains
and ∆(ω, s) is ω’s deontic structure on A(ω, s) in state s,8
• a preference structure-operator Π : Ω× S −→ P where P is a set of
preference structures of the same type with subsets of A as domains
and Π(ω, s) is ω ’s preference structure on A(ω, s) in state s,
• a choice-set function Γ : Ω× S −→ ℘(A) where Γ(ω, s) is the set of
actions for ω to choose from in state s.
A situation for the Dalmas D is determined by the agent to move, ω,
and the state s. A situation is represented by an ordered pair 〈ω, s〉. The
set of situations for D is thus Ω× S.
In aDalmas, all the agents have the same initial set of actions. The set
of actions to choose from (the choice-set) in a situation 〈ω, s〉 is determined
by the agent’s deontic structure ∆(ω, s) and preference structure Π(ω, s).
If Γ(ω, s) consists of one action, then this action applied in the situation
〈ω, s〉 is the resulting state when ω acts in state s.
A simple Dalmas is aDalmas containing the following simple versions
of ∆, Π, and Γ.
1. ∆(ω, s) ⊆ A(ω, s) and ∆(ω, s) is the set of permissible actions for ω
in the state s,
2. Π(ω, s) = 〈A(ω, s),%〉 where % is a weak ordering,9
3. Γ(ω, s) = {x ∈ ∆(ω, s) : for all y ∈ ∆(ω, s), x % y} .
7According to Savage [26] p.13: “an act is a function attaching a consequence to each state
of the world”.
8Two structures are of the same type if they have the same number of relations and
corresponding relations in both structures have the same arity.
9〈A,%〉 is a weak ordering if for all a, b, c in A, the following axioms are satisfied: a % b or
b % a; if a % b and b % c, then a % c.
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Hence, in a simple Dalmas the choice-set consists of the best actions
which are permissible. Among the elements in A there can be a pass
action, which means the agent does nothing. If we combine the existence
of such an action with very short clock cycles, we obtain systems with
close to asynchronous behaviour (cf. [5] [10]).
A Dalmas is not deterministic, since it does not determine in which
order the agents are going to move, and the choice-set may contain more
than one action in every situation. Let us therefore make the following
definition.
Definition. A deterministic Dalmas is an ordered 9-tuple
〈Ω, A, S,A,∆,Π,Γ, τ, γ〉 such that 〈Ω, A, S,A,∆,Π,Γ〉 is a Dalmas
and
• τ : Ω −→ Ω is a turn-operator such that τ (ω) = κ means that it is
κ’s turn after ω; τ determines a simple agent priority,
• γ : ℘(A) −→ A is a tie-breaking function, determining which of
several permissible and equally preferred actions to choose.
Note that γ(Γ(ω, s)) ∈ A and thus [γ(Γ(ω, s))] (ω, s) ∈ S. Define f :
Ω× S −→ Ω× S in the following way:
f(ω, s) = 〈τ (ω), [γ(Γ(ω, s))] (ω, s)〉. Note further that it is possible to
iterate f. We define fn as:
f1(ω, s) = f(ω, s)
fn(ω, s) = f(f (n−1)(ω, s)).
Definition. The k-event run of a deterministic Dalmas D determined by
the initial situation 〈ω0, s0〉 is the sequence
〈
〈ω0, s0〉 , f
1(ω0, s0), ..., f
k(ω0, s0)
〉
.
Suppose that 〈Ω, A, S,A,∆,Π,Γ, τ, γ〉 is a deterministicDalmas. Then
〈Ω×S, T, φ〉 is a dynamical system, where T is the set of natural numbers
and φ is the evolution operator defined by φ : Ω× S × T −→ Ω× S such
that
φ(ω, s, 0) = 〈ω, s〉
φ(ω, s, t) = f t(ω, s) if t ≥ 1.10
Note that 〈φ(ω0, s0, 0), φ(ω0, s0, 1), ..., φ(ω0, s0, k)〉 is the run of D deter-
mined by 〈ω0, s0〉 and consisting of k moves.
3.2 The Waste Collector System as a Dalmas
We elucidate some of the aspects of the definition of a Dalmas using the
waste collectors example introduced in section 2.1.
3.2.1 Agents and States
Suppose that we have a set Ω of k agents, Ω = {ω1, ..., ωk} . A state for the
system is characterized by the position of each of the agents, the location
10See, for example, [6] p.8 for a definition of dynamical system.
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of the waste, and the amount of waste each agent has collected. A state
s is therefore characterized by three functions,
pi : Ω −→N2 such that pi(ω1) 6= pi(ω2) if ω1 6= ω2.
γ : N2 −→ Re.
σ : Ω −→ Re.
pi assigns a position to each of the agents, γ assigns the amount of
waste to each position, and σ assigns the amount of waste each agent
has collected. To denote points in N2, bold face letters x,y,... will be
used. If x = 〈x1, x2〉 ∈ N
2 then x(1) = x1 and x
(2) = x2. If the state s
is represented by the ordered triple of pi,γ and σ, i.e. s = 〈pi, γ, σ〉 , then
s(1) = pi, s(2) = γ, and s(3) = σ. Let S be the state space of the system.
A state s can be an initial state if s(3)(ω) = 0, for all ω ∈ Ω.
3.2.2 Actions and Utility
Each agent has a repertoire of four different actions, viz. going east, going
south, going west, and going north. For simplicity, we denote the actions
with their point of compass: east, south, west, and north. Now, east is
defined as: east(ω, s) = 〈pi, γ, σ〉 where
1. pi(ω) = 〈(s(1)(ω))(1) + 1, (s(2)(ω))(2)〉 and pi(κ) = s(1)(κ), if κ 6= ω,
2. γ(x, y) = 0 if pi(ω) = 〈x, y〉 and γ(x, y) = s(2)(x, y), if pi(ω) 6= 〈x, y〉 ,
3. σ(ω) = s(3)(ω) + s(2)(pi(ω)).
The other actions are defined analogously. The ‘feasibility function’ A is
such that an action is feasible as long as the performing of the action leads
to a new state within the boundaries of the grid.
The preference structure is determined by a utility function
Uω : S −→ Re for every agent ω: Π(ω, s) = 〈A(ω, s),%ω,s〉, such that
a %ω,s b iff Uω(a(ω, s)) ≥ Uω(b(ω, s)).
The utility function for an agent can be defined in many ways and we
will leave open the exact definition of it. The norm-regulated Dalmas
can have its choice-set function Γ defined as:
Γ(ω, s) = {x ∈ ∆(ω, s) : for all y ∈ ∆(ω, s), x %ω,s y} .
4 Conditions and Normative Systems for
a Dalmas
4.1 Preamble
In this section, the building blocks of norms which can regulate a Dalmas
will be described. The grounds and consequences consist of conditions on
agents, true or false in a situation. This kind of conditions are called
sit-conditions. As its core, a sit-condition has a state-condition, i.e. a
condition true or false in a state. We obtain sit-conditions from state-
conditions by the application of the operators M,T1, ..., T7. Suppose c is
a ν-ary state-condition. Then c(ω1, ..., ωk) is true or false in a state s and
Mc and Tic are ν+1-ary sit-conditions. Mc(ω1, ..., ων , ων+1) is defined
as being true in situation 〈ω, s〉 if and only if c(ω1, ..., ωk) is true in s
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and it is ων+1’s turn to draw, i.e. ων+1 = ω. Tic(ω1, ..., ων , ων+1) is
true in 〈ω, s〉 if and only if Ti is the normative position for ων+1 with
respect to c(ω1, ..., ων) being true in the state that will be the result of
the action taken in 〈ω, s〉, where Ti is the ith type of the one agent
positions. Elementary norms for a Dalmas are ordered pairs of the form
〈Mc, Tid〉 where c and d are state-conditions, Mc is the ground, and Tid
the consequence. In this essay, we will focus on elementary norms.
The rest of this section is devoted to a detailed development of the
ideas just presented.
4.2 State-Conditions and Sit-Conditions
The idea behind the definition of a Dalmas is that its behaviour will be
regulated by a normative system and that the normative system will be
represented by a ground-consequence system 〈B1,B2,J 〉 where B1 and B2
are condition implication structures. The condition of interests in connec-
tion with a Dalmas is a little more complicated than those discussed in
section 2 and it is pertinent to distinguish between two different kinds of
conditions, viz.
1. condition on agents in a state, abbreviated just ‘state-condition’
2. condition on agents in a situation, abbreviated just ‘sit-condition’.
A ν−ary state-condition c is true or false of ν agents ω1, ..., ων in a
state s, which will be written c(ω1, ..., ων ; s). Note the use of the semi-
colon to separate the state from the agents. A ν−ary sit-condition d is
true or false of ν agents ω1, ..., ων in a state 〈ω, s〉, which will be written
d(ω1, ..., ων ;ω, s).
A normative system regulating a Dalmas is a ground-consequence
system 〈B1,B2,J 〉 where B1 and B2 are condition implication structures
consisting of certain kinds of sit-conditions. These sit-conditions are the
result of applying certain operations to state-conditions. We discuss this
in next subsection.
4.3 The Move-Operator
Let us now introduce the move-operator M which transforms a ν−ary
state-condition to a ν−ary sit-condition.
Definition. M is an operator on state-conditions such that if c is a ν−ary
state-condition then Mc is a ν−ary sit-condition and
Mc(ω1, ..., ων , ων+1;ω, s) iff ων+1 = ω and c(ω1, ..., ων ; s).
Note that Mc(ω1, ..., ων , ων+1;ω, s) means that ων+1 is to move in
state 〈ω, s〉 (since ων+1 = ω), and c(ω1, ..., ων ; s).
If 〈B,∧,′ , R〉 is a Boolean quasi-ordering where B consists of state-
conditions. Define BM = {Mb : b ∈ B} . We can now define a unary
operation ′M on BM in the following way: (Mc)
′
M =M(c
′).
Note that (Mc)′M (ω1, ..., ων , ων+1;ω, s) iff M(c
′)(ω1, ..., ων , ων+1;ω, s)
iff ων+1 = ω and c
′(ω1, ..., ων ; s). Define a binary relation ∧M on BM in
the following way: Mb ∧M Mc =M(b ∧ c).
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Note that (Mb ∧M Mc)(ω1, ..., ων , ων+1;ω, s) iff
M(b ∧ c)(ω1, ..., ων , ων+1;ω, s) iff
[ων+1 = ω and (b ∧ c)(ω1, ..., ων ; s)] iff
[ων+1 = ω and b(ω1, ..., ων ; s) and c(ω1, ..., ων ; s)] iff
[(Mb)(ω1, ..., ων , ων+1;ω, s) and (Mc)(ω1, ..., ων , ων+1;ω, s)].
Let us further define a binary relation RM on B in the following way:
bRc. It is easy to see that M is an isomorphism from 〈B,∧,′ , R〉 to
〈BM ,∧M ,
′
M , RM 〉 which thus also is a Boolean quasiordering. We say
that 〈BM ,∧M ,
′
M , RM 〉 is the m-cis over 〈B,∧,
′ , R〉.
4.4 The Type-Operators
Type-operators (see [21]) can be applied to state-conditions, resulting in
sit-conditions.
Definition. For i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 7, Ti is an operator on state-conditions such
that if c is a ν−ary state-condition then Tic is a ν−ary sit-condition and
Tic(ω1, ..., ων , ων+1;ω, s) iff Ti(ων+1, c(ω1, ..., ων ; s
+)) where Ti is the ith
type of the one agent positions and s+ is the state which will be the result
of the action taken by ω in state s.
The meaning of Ti is discussed in more detail in section 5.
Suppose that 〈B,∧,′ , R〉 is a Boolean quasi-ordering where B consists
of state-conditions, define BT = {Tib : b ∈ B and 1 ≤ i ≤ 7}. BT is the
set of normative positions over B. If Tib, Tjc ∈ BT , then define
(1) (Tib ∧T Tjc)(ω1, ..., ων , ων+1;ω, s) iff Tib(ω1, ..., ων , ων+1;ω, s) and
Tjc(ω1, ..., ων , ων+1;ω, s),
(2) (Tib)
′
T (ω1, ..., ων , ων+1;ω, s) iff ¬Tib(ω1, ..., ων , ων+1;ω, s).
Define B∗T recursively as follows:
(1) BT ⊆ B
∗
T
(2) If p, q ∈ B∗T then p
′
T ∈ B
∗
T and p ∧T q ∈ B
∗
T
(3) The only members of B∗T are those resulting from a finite number
of applications of (1) and (2).
Definition. A normative-position-cis (np-cis) over a cis 〈B,∧,′ , R〉 is a
Boolean quasi-ordering 〈B∗T ,∧T ,
′
T , RT 〉 with ⊤T as unit element, ⊥T as
zero element and where QT is the indifference part of RT such that the
following requirements are satisfied. For any c, d ∈ B it holds that:
(1) if i 6= j, then (Tid ∧T Tjd)RT⊥T (for i, j ∈ {1, ..., 7}),
(2) ⊤TRT (T1d ∨T ... ∨T T7d),
(3) T1dQTT1(d
′), T3dQTT3(d
′), T6dQTT6(d
′), T2dQTT4(d
′), T5dQTT7(d
′)
(4) if c = d then TicQTTid (for i, j ∈ {1, ..., 7}),
(5) Ti(⊤)QT⊥T if i = 1, 3, 4, 7,
(6) Ti(⊥)QT⊥T if i = 1, 2, 3, 5.
The reason for (3) is a kind of ‘symmetry principle ’(see section 2.3),
and the justification for (4) is a logical postulate. The notion of an np-cis
was introduced in [21].
16
4.5 A Norm-Regulated Dalmas
Definition. A normative system N for a Dalmas D is a gc-system
〈CM ,DT ,J 〉 such that CM=〈CM ,∧M ,
′
M , RM 〉 is them-cis over 〈C,∧,
′ , RC〉
and DT = 〈D
∗
T ,∧T ,
′
T , RT 〉 is an np-cis over 〈D,∧,
′ , RD〉 where C and D
are sets of state-conditions for D.
In the sequel, we will omit the M and T subscripts in ∧M and
′
M , and
in ∧T and
′
T .
If 〈CM ,DT ,J 〉 is a normative system, then it is joining CM and DT .
If 〈x, y〉 ∈ J then 〈x, y〉 is a norm in N and x is the ground and y is
the consequence of that norm. Note that a norm in N is a correlation of
normative consequences to descriptive conditions. If 〈x, y〉 is a norm in N
and y ∈ DT then 〈x, y〉 is an elementary norm. An elementary norm in
N is an ordered pair 〈Mc, Tid〉 where c ∈ C and d ∈ D and the intended
interpretation of it is a sentence of the following form:
∀ω1, ..., ων , ω ∈ Ω : ∀s ∈ S :Mc(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s)→ Tid(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s
+)
or somewhat more generally:
∀ω1, ..., ωϕ, ω ∈ Ω : ∀s ∈ S :Mc(ω1, ..., ωµ, ω;ω, s)→ Tid(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s
+)
where ϕ = max{µ, ν} and s+ is the state which will be the result of the
action taken by ω in state s. In both cases the norm above is represented
as the ordered pair 〈Mc, Tid〉 .
Definition. A norm-regulated Dalmas is a system [D,N ] where D is a
Dalmas and N is a normative system for D.
The idea behind a norm-regulated Dalmas is that the deontic struc-
ture operator ∆ is defined in terms of N in the sense that what is per-
missible to do in a situation is determined by the normative system. We
will return to this in section 5.
4.6 Norms for the Waste Collectors
Essential to the behaviour of the collectors is how close they are to each
other. To be able to talk about the nearness of the collectors it is conve-
nient to infer the notion of an n-surrounding.
Definition. The n−surrounding of the point 〈x, y〉 ∈ N 2 is the set
{〈z, u〉 : |x − z| ≤ n and |y − u| ≤ n}, and denoted by Surrn(x, y).
We can now define a family of state-conditions expressing overlapping
surroundings:
Definition. Lapj is the state-condition such that Lapj(ω1, ω2; s) iff
Surrj(s
(1)(ω1)) ∩ Surrj(s
(1)(ω2)) contains exactly j elements.
If we apply the move operator and the type operators, we obtain
sit-conditions from the state-conditions Lapj , i.e. we get MLapj and
TiLapj .We also need the non-identity condition d, defined by d(ω1, ω2) iff
ω1 6= ω2, and the sit-condition Md.
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We can use the introduced terminology to express the norms for the
waste collectors presented in subsection 2.1. The result is the following set
of ordered pairs of sit-conditions. For legibility reasons, we use − instead
of ′ for negation.
1. 〈MLap0, T4Lap2 ∨ T6Lap2 ∨ T7Lap2〉
2. 〈MLap0, T4Lap3 ∨ T6Lap3 ∨ T7Lap3〉
3. 〈MLap0, T1Lap0 ∨ T2Lap0 ∨ T3Lap0 ∨ T5Lap0〉
4. 〈MLap0, T1Lap1 ∨ T2Lap1 ∨ T3Lap1 ∨ T5Lap1〉
5. For all i, 0 ≤ j ≤ 9, 〈MLap1, T1Lapj ∨ T2Lapj ∨ T3Lapj ∨ T5Lapj〉
6. For all i, 0 ≤ j ≤ 9, 〈MLap2, T1Lapj ∨ T2Lapj ∨ T3Lapj ∨ T5Lapj〉
7. 〈M(−Lap4 ∧ −Lap6 ∧ −Lap9), T7Lap6〉
8. 〈MLap4, T7Lap3〉
9. 〈MLap6, T5(Lap4 ∨ Lap6 ∨ Lap9)〉
10. 〈Md, T7Lap9〉
11. 〈M⊤, T1Lap0 ∨ T2Lap0 ∨ T3Lap0 ∨ T5Lap0〉
The correspondence between the norms (n1) − (n8) in section 2 and
the norms above is the following:
(n1) is represented as (1) and (2),
(n2) is represented as (3) and (4),
(n3) is represented as (5) and (6),
(n4) is represented as (7),
(n5) is represented as (8),
(n6) is represented as (9),
(n7) is represented as (10),
(n8) is represented as (11).
Note that the among the norms (1)-(11), only (7)-(10) are elementary.
5 From Norms to Actions
In this section, a scheme for how normative positions will restrict the set
of acts that the agents are permitted to choose from is presented. The
idea behind a norm-regulated Dalmas is that the deontic structure oper-
ator ∆ is defined in terms of N in the sense that what is permissible to
do in a situation is determined by the normative system. More formally,
let us suppose that the system is in situation 〈ω, s〉 and that 〈Mc, Tid〉 is
a norm in N . Suppose further that c and d are υ−ary and c(ω1, ..., ων ; s).
Hence, Mc(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s). From Mc(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) together with
the norm 〈Mc, Tid〉 follows that Tid(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s). An important
question now is what restrictions on the set of feasible acts follow from
Tid(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s), i.e. what is prohibited by Tid(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s)?
Let us see what holds when i = 2. The intended interpretation of T2 is
given by
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T2d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) iff T2(ω, d(ω1, ..., ων ; s
+)) iff
MayDo(ω, d(ω1, ..., ων ; s
+)) & MayPass(ω, d(ω1, ..., ων ; s
+)) &
¬MayDo(ω,¬d(ω1, ..., ων ; s
+)).
Only the third conjunction above results in a prohibition: in the sit-
uation 〈ω, s〉 , ω may not see to it that not d(ω1, ..., ων) will be the case
in the next state. What does this mean? If in state s d(ω1, ..., ων) is true
but in state s+, which is the result of ω’s performing action a in situation
s, d(ω1, ..., ων) is not true, then ω has seen to it that not d(ω1, ..., ων), by
doing a. Since ω may not see to it that d(ω1, ..., ων), it follows that a is
prohibited.
Let us now consider the case i = 3. According to the intended inter-
pretation of T3d it holds that
T3d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) iff
MayDo(ω, d(ω1, ..., ων ; s
+)) & ¬ MayPass(ω, d(ω1, ..., ων ; s
+)) &
MayDo(ω,¬d(ω1, ..., ων ; s
+)).
If d(ω1, ..., ων) is true in s and d(ω1, ..., ων) is true in s
+, then Pass(ω, d(ω1, ..., ων ; s
+)).
If ¬d(ω1, ..., ων) is true in s and ¬d(ω1, ..., ων) is true in s
+ then Pass(ω, d(ω1, ..., ων ; s
+)).
Therefore,
Pass(ω, d(ω1, ..., ων ; s)) iff
[
d(ω1, ..., ων) is true in s iff d(ω1, ..., ων) is true in s
+
]
.
Hence, if ω may not be passive with regard to d(ω1, ..., ων) in 〈ω, s〉, then
[d(ω1, ..., ων ; s) iff d(ω1, ..., ων ; a(ω, s))] implies that a is prohibited.
The other type-operators Ti can be analyzed in an analogous way. As
the result of such an analysis, we suggest the following stipulations.11
1. From T1d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) follows no restriction on the acts.
2. From T2d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) follows that
if d(ω1, ..., ων ; s) and ¬d(ω1, ..., ων ; a(ω, s)) then Prohibitedω,s(a).
3. From T3d(ω1, ..., ωνω;ω, s) follows that
if [d(ω1, ..., ων ; s) iff d(ω1, ..., ων ; a(ω, s))] then Prohibitedω,s(a).
4. From T4d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) follows that
if ¬d(ω1, ..., ων ; s) and d(ω1, ..., ων ; a(ω, s)) then Prohibitedω,s(a).
5. From T5d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) follows that
if ¬d(ω1, ..., ων ; a(ω, s)) then Prohibitedω,s(a).
6. From T6d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) follows that
if not [d(ω1, ..., ων ; s) iff d(ω1, ..., ων ; a(ω, s)] then Prohibitedω,s(a).
7. From T7d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) follows that
if d(ω1, ..., ων ; a(ω, s)) then Prohibitedω,s(a).
These stipulations can now be used to define the deontic structure-
operator ∆. One possibility is to let ∆(ω, s) be the set of feasible acts
a that are not eliminated as Prohibitedω,s(a) according to the rules 1-
7 above, where Prohibitedω,s(a) is equivalent to ¬Permissibleω,s(a).
12
Hence, ∆(ω, s) = {Permissibleω,s(a) : a ∈ A}.
11Note that this explication of T1 − T7 can easily be transformed to an explication of the
one agent types T1-T7 within the framework of predicate logic.
12The mentioned connection between Prohibited and Permissible is naturally not the only
possible.
19
Note that in the outset all feasible acts are permissible, i.e. for all
a ∈ A, Permissibleω,s(a). The basic idea is now that we eliminate elements
from the set of permissible acts for ω in s using the norms and sentences
expressing what holds for the agents with respect to grounds in the norms.
To facilitate the presentation it is convenient to introduce the following
six operators on state-conditions:
Ea2d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) iff [d(ω1, ..., ων ; s) and ¬d(ω1, ..., ων ; a(ω, s))]
Ea3d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) iff [d(ω1, ..., ων ; s) iff d(ω1, ..., ων ; a(ω, s))]
Ea4d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) iff [¬d(ω1, ..., ων ; s) and d(ω1, ..., ων ; a(ω, s))]
Ea5d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) iff [¬d(ω1, ..., ων ; a(ω, s))]
Ea6d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) iff not [d(ω1, ..., ων ; s) iff d(ω1, ..., ων ; a(ω, s))]
Ea7d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) iff d(ω1, ..., ων ; a(ω, s)).
Note that for all i, 2 ≤ i ≤ 7, (Tid ∧ E
a
i d)(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) implies that
Prohibitedω,s(a).
In situation 〈ω, s〉, the action a is prohibited if there are c ∈ C and
d ∈ D such that 〈Mc, Tid〉 is a norm for some i, 2 ≤ i ≤ 7, and there are
ω1, ω2, ...ων ∈ Ω such thatMc(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) and E
a
i d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s).
The essential part of the procedure is the following inference:
Mc(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) & 〈Mc, Tid〉
Tid(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) E
a
i d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s)
Prohibitedω,s(a)
Now we can for the normative systemN=〈CM ,DT ,J 〉 define Prohibitedω,s
more explicitly as:
Prohibitedω,s = {a ∈ A(ω, s) | ∃c ∈ C : ∃d ∈ D : ∃i, 2 ≤ i ≤ 7 :
〈Mc, Tid〉 ∈ J & ∃ω1, ...ων ∈ Ω :Mc(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) &
Eai d(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s)}.
Thus, ∆(ω, s) can be defined as ∆(ω, s) = A(ω, s)\Prohibitedω,s, i.e.
∆(ω, s) = {a ∈ A(ω, s) | a /∈Prohibitedω,s}.
For a simple Dalmas it is a small step from ∆(ω, s) to Γ(ω, s). If
D is a simple Dalmas, then Γ(ω, s) = Π(ω, s)/∆(ω, s), i.e. Γ(ω, s) =
〈∆(ω, s),%′〉, where %′ is the restriction of % to ∆(ω, s).
In the definition of Prohibitedω,s above, we use only norms that are el-
ementary. Whether this implies substantial limitations will here be left as
an open problem. Consider for example the norm 〈Mc, t〉 where t ∈ D∗T .
The problem is under what state condition e the consequence t implies a
prohibition of an act. We do not deal with this problem, but just point
out that
(Ti1d1 ∨ Ti2d2)(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) −→[
(Eai1d1 ∧ E
a
i2
d2)(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) −→ Prohibitedω,s(a)
]
.
(Ti1d1 ∧ Ti2d2)(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) −→[
(Eai1d1 ∨ E
a
i2
d2)(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) −→ Prohibitedω,s(a)
]
.
Another way of dealing with 〈Mc, t〉 is to try and show that all pro-
hibitions following from it also follow from elementary (and eventually
minimal) norms.
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6 Conclusion and Discussion
The aim of this study is to present a theory of how norms can be used
to regulate the behaviour of multi-agent systems on the assumption that
the role of norms is to define the Spielraum for an agent. The theory can
be summarized as follows. The norms for a Mas are regarded as belong-
ing to a normative system and such a system is represented algebraically
as a ground-consequence system containing a Boolean quasi-ordering of
grounds and a Boolean quasi-ordering of consequences. The norms are
joinings from grounds to consequences, and the specific normative con-
tent of a normative system is given by the set of minimal norms. The
consequences are expressed using operators on conditions corresponding
to the Kanger-Lindahl types of one-agent positions. An important step
in the theory construction is the specification under what circumstances
the sentence Tid(ω1, ..., ων , ω;ω, s) implies that an action a is prohibited
for the agent ω in the state s (see section 5). An action a is regarded as
a function, which is the usual way of representing an action in decision
theory, and d is a ν-ary condition on agents, true or false in the situa-
tion s. An abstract architecture based on the theory of norm-regulation
of behaviour is defined, and a Mas having this architecture is called a
norm-regulated Dalmas. The system of waste collectors is an example of
a such a norm-regulated Dalmas.
An important tool in the present study is the characterization of ab-
stract architectures by the definitions of set-theoretical predicates. Among
the abstract architectures defined in this way, the most important one is
a norm-regulated Dalmas, as exemplified in the previous section. This is
just the first step towards a theory of architectures for Mas that restricts
the behaviour of the system using norms. The theory can be developed by
defining a number of set-theoretical predicates that are specifications of
the predicate Dalmas, and we can obtain a hierarchy of predicates with
Dalmas as its root.13
There are many refinements and extensions to be made before it is
possible to state the significance of the theory. For instance, the mini-
mal norms represent the specific normative content of a normative sys-
tem. It is therefore a reasonable question, whether, in the definition of
Prohibitedω,s, it is sufficient to regard only minimal norms. Note that the
stipulations expressing under what conditions Tid implies that the act a
is prohibited are independent of the structure over the consequences. The
latter, however, is relevant to determining the minimal norms.
Moreover, in the definition of Prohibitedω,s above, we use only norms
that are elementary. Whether this implies substantial limitations ought
to be investigated. Consider the norm 〈Mc, t〉 where t ∈ D∗T . Under what
state condition e does the consequence t imply a prohibition of an act? Is
it possible to prove that all prohibitions following from it also follow from
elementary (and minimal) norms?
We have only considered norms of a rather special kind. The descrip-
tive conditions are conditions on agents. Let us call them ‘agent norms’.
13One set-theoretical predicate P2 is a specification of another P1 if the following holds: if
S2 is a P2 there is a sub-sequence S1 of S2 that is a P1. The relation ‘to be a specification
of’ is a partial order.
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An example of an elementary agent norm is 〈Mc, Tid〉, where c and d
are conditions on agents, true or false in a state. However, it is easy to
generalize so that c and d can be conditions not just on agents but on a
set U containing agents and objects of other kinds, for example physical
objects. It seems to be straightforward to change our definitions so that
this alternative will be accommodated.
Norms of a radically different character than agent norms are norms
determining which are the agent norms for a Mas. Such norms can for
example give competence to some agents to functions as a kind of ‘legis-
lators’ and change the agent norms [29].
In this essay, we have tried to show how theories of normative positions
and normative systems can be used in constructing an architecture for
norm-regulated Mas. However, we have only used a small portion of
the Kanger-Lindahl theory of normative positions, namely the theory of
one-agent types. According to the intended interpretation of the type
operators in section 4,
Tic(ω1, ..., ων , ων+1;ω, s)
means that ων+1 has the normative positions of type Ti with respect to the
state of affairs that c(ω1, ..., ων ; s
+). Here Ti is a one-agent type-operator.
A two-agent type-operator Wi applied to c will give a condition Wic such
that
Wic(ω1, ..., ων , ων+1, ων+2;ω, s)
means that the party ων+1 has the normative positions of type Wi versus
the counter party ων+2 with respect to the state of affairs that c(ω1, ..., ων ;ω, s
+).
14 The use of two-agent type-operators in norm-regulated Dalmas will
increase the strength and flexibility of the Dalmas hierarchy of abstract
architectures.
In a norm-regulated Dalmas, the normative system plays the role of
constitutive rules, and it is not possible for the agents to break the norms.
In spite of this, it is reasonable to distinguish between ‘may’ and ‘can’.
What an agent ω can do in a situation s is given by A(ω, s) and what it
may do is determined by ∆(ω, s). Note also that the formal framework
for representing norms can be used for different kinds of norms, even
regulative norms. For example, an agent can choose between obeying a
regulative law or breaking it and thereby giving one or several other agents
the right (but possibly not the duty) to punish it, either immediately or
when it is its turn to move. This can easily be expressed using normative
positions.
Dalmas and deterministic Dalmas are intended to function as wide
frames for studying norm-regulations of Mas and thus to be weak abstract
architectures. Are they weak enough or are they excluding something
essential? As has been pointed out earlier, for instance, a Dalmas has
global states and global dynamics. This fact notwithstanding, the formal
definition of a Dalmas is flexible enough to incorporate a kind of history
dependence. One way of doing this is to introduce a set P of primary states
(phases) such that s ∈ S iff s = 〈p, 〈p1, ..., pν〉〉, where p, p1, ..., pν ∈ P.
14See [17], chapter 4.
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The intended interpretation is that when D is in s thenD is in the primary
state p and its history is 〈p1, ..., pν〉, i.e. the passed primary states of D
is given by 〈p1, ..., pν〉. Note that if s1 = 〈p, σ1〉 and s2 = 〈p, σ2〉 where
σ1 6= σ2, then it is possible that a(ω, s1) 6= a(ω, s2), so the result of
ω performing act a in the primary state p is dependent on the passed
primary states of D.
Another way to obtain history dependence is to use the definition of a
run (see section 3.1). With some modifications a run can be regarded as
a state consisting of situations based on primary states. In this case we
have dependence not just on passed primary states but on passed primary
situations. If the Dalmas in question is deterministic, passed actions
also determine passed primary situations, but the opposite does not hold.
Therefore, we can distinguish between dependence on previous primary
states, dependence on previous primary situations, and dependence on
previous actions.
Suppose that D is a Dalmas, in which the agents cooperate to solve a
problem. Which normative system will lead to the most effective behavior
of the system? It is desirable that D itself could determine the optimal
normative system for the task in question. Given a set of grounds and a set
of consequences, which together constitute the vocabulary of the system,
D can test all possible sets of minimal norms. If there is a function for
evaluating the result of a run of D, then different normative systems can
be compared and the best system can be chosen. A change of vocabulary
corresponds to a mutation in the normative system, which can lead to
dramatic changes of efficiency. Note that, in principle, the evaluation
function can be very complicated, for example it can be multi-dimensional
and based on ideas of fairness. This seems to imply that we can treat
multi-agent systems as consisting of cooperative agents even if they do
not have what is usually called ‘a common interest’ and cooperate only
in the sense that they want to avoid destructive conflicts.
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